one particular branch of the time line corresponds to what actually will happen. The full treatment of this issue has not yet been worked out. McDermott, 82] , Pinto and Reiter, 93] Planning language: For practical applications, perhaps the most important problem is to develop a simple tractable language of knowledge e ects and knowledge preconditions, analogous to the STRIPS Fikes and Nilsson, 71] language of add lists, delete lists, and precondition lists. One interesting preliminary attempt at this is made in Etzioni et al., 92] ; however, much further work remains.
Better fundamental theory: Finally, I am not convinced that our theory has reached rock bottom in the analysis of epistemic feasibility. The de nitions are complicated and must be mentally argued through; they do not evoke immediate assent. It is clear that di erent notions of feasibility are appropriate to di erent circumstances; our theory does not provide any indication when to use one de nition rather than another. It seems likely that there is some deeper sense of an agent being able to carry out or to think through a plan, of which the theory developed here is a consequence or an approximation. tute other temporal theories as long as they support the possibility of alternative actions at a moment and impose a partial order on time. In particular, there is no need to require that the time line be discrete, as in the situation calculus. There is no harm in allowing the time line to be dense, as long as the switch from one action to the next occurs at discrete points.
Epistemic Theory: It is easy to adapt most of the theory to a more explicitly intensional representation for epistemic states, such as a modal or a syntactic theory. The largest di erence is in the theory of plans. The view we have taken that any set of intervals constitutes a plan becomes unnatural in an intensional theory. However, without that assumption, some of the proofs in section 3 fall through. It would be interesting to study how this gap could be lled in.
Concurrency: Synchronous concurrency can be handled by modifying the time line so that an arc between situations corresponds to a set of primitive actions being executed simultaneously Gelfond et al., 91] Lin and Shoham, 92] . Asynchronous concurrency can be reduced to synchronous concurrency by representing an action A as the iteration of the primitive action \continue(A)" for an indeterminate number of time quanta.
Actions with Indeterminate E ects: Our theory assumes that in each situation an action has a determinate result. In many cases, such as rolling a die, this assumption may not be appropriate. There are two ways of extending our theory to accommodate such actions. The simpler approach is to treat this simply as a case of ignorance. Before rolling a die, there are six accessible possible worlds: in the rst, the die will come up one; in the second, it will come up two; and so on. An alternative would be to modify the time line to admit two kinds of branching: one corresponding to the agent's choice of action and the other to indeterminacy of e ect. This approach would require the theory to be reformulated to distinguish clearly between the sequence of actions performed, which is under the agent's control, and the interval traversed, which is not. (The current theory essentially uses an interval as a convenient way to denote a sequence of events.)
External Events: The incorporation of external events into our theory does not raise any further di culties besides those already addressed above. The fact that external events occur concurrently with the agent's actions can be handled in the same way as concurrent actions. The fact that they may not be entirely predictable can be handled in the same way as actions with indeterminate e ects. The fact that they occur as a result of physical law rather than agent choice can be handled by asserting a theory of physical constraints among events and states of the usual kind. As argued above, there is no di culty in incorporating physical theories that involve continuous time, as long as the sequence of actions remains discrete.
Other Agents: If there is more than one autonomous intelligent agent, then each agent has his own epistemic state and his own choice of actions. Giving agents separate epistemic states requires only making the agent an additional argument to the knowledge accessibility relation (or whatever other epistemic representation is used.) Giving agents separate powers of choice requires restructuring the time line along the lines discussed above: we must admit more than one type of branching (one for each agent), and we must consider an agent as controlling only the sequence of his own actions but not the overall interval that will be traversed. A further di culty is that, in planning, we often wish to predict that, though an agent has a choice of actions, he will in fact do one particular thing. For example, in an environment of cooperative agents, we would like to state the default rule, \If one agent makes a request of another, then the latter will carry it out, if he can." To express this, we need to distinguish between what an agent can do and what he will do; that is, we need to be able to say that (b) it is known that Q does not hold in S and PB is epistemically feasible as task in S then the plan \if(Q; PA; PB)" is epistemically feasible as task in S1.
Actually, we will just prove part (a) of each; the proof of (b) is exactly analogous.
Lemma 7.1: 8 S1A;S2A k acc(S1; S1A) ) executes(PE; S1A; S2A) , executes(PF; S1A; S2A)]] ) task ep feasible(PE; S1) , task ep feasible(PF; S1)] (If it is known that PE executes from the current state if and only if PF does, then PE is epistemically feasible as task if and only if PF is.)
Proof: Follows directly from Lemma 4.3, together with the observation that any specialization of PF from a knowledge accessible situation S1A is also a specialization of PE. Note that this corresponds to rule 4 of section 1 for epistemic feasibility as task.
Theorem 7:
PF=if(Q; PE; PG)^8 S1A k acc(S1; S1A) ) holds(Q; S1A)] ) executable(PF; S1) , executable(PE; S1)]^ task ep feasible(PF; S1) , task ep feasible(PE; S1)].
(If Q is known in S1, then the conditional \if(Q; PE; PG)" is executable just if PE is executable and is epistemically feasible as task just if PE is epistemically feasible as task.
Proof: By de nition of the conditional (PL2.4), for any situation S1A accessible from S1, PF executes over S1A; S2A] if and only if PE executes over S1A; S2A]. The result then follows from lemmas 4.3 and 7.1.2 4 Limitations, Extensions, and Future Work
The theory above assumes a particular representation language and a restrictive ontology. It will be necessary to loosen these if the theory is to be applied to rich real world domains. Certain extensions can be made easily; others appear to be very di cult. There are, I think, two assumptions that are fundamental to the structure of this solution to the knowledge preconditions problem. The rst is the assumption that primitive actions are performed discretely. That is, you perform one action (or one set of concurrent actions); then you perform the next action; then the next action; and so on. What this excludes is the possibility of continuously adjusting the action you are performing, as is done in a control strategy with continuous monitoring. The logical interface between planning and control Dean and Wellman, 90] is, in any case, murky; but this requirement may place unwelcome restrictions on the space of possible solutions. 13 The second fundamental premise is the assumption that there exists a particular level of \primi-tive" actions. It is often useful to reason about actions at multiple levels of granularity Hobbs, 85] , re ning a coarse description using high-level actions into a more precise description using low-level actions. For such reasoning to be coherent, there should be some connection between the conclusions that are drawn at the various levels; if a plan P is found to be feasible when described at a high-level, then (at a minimum) there should be a low-level re nement of P that is likewise feasible. It is not at all clear that this kind of consistency can be achieved for the theory we have presented here.
Other extensions to the theory seem to be comparatively straightforward:
Temporal Theory: We have used the situation calculus, but it should be possible to substi- 13 Jim Crawford suggests the following approach, generalizing the work of Kuipers and Byun, 91] : An agent follows a xed control strategy until a landmark value is reached. Landmark values occur discretely. The high-level plan speci es the rules for passing from one control strategy to the next. executable(PA; S1)^8 S2 succeeds(PA; S1; S2) ) executable(PB; S2)] ) executable(sequence(PA; PB),S1). (If PA is executable in S1 and PB is executable after every successful completion of PA, then sequence(PA; PB) is executable in S1.)
Proof: Universal abstraction from lemma 6.13, using the assumptions enumerated before lemma 6.8. 2 Lemma 6.14: specialization(PAS; PA)^specialization(PBS; PB)] ) specialization(sequence(PAS; PBS), sequence(PA; PB)).
(If PAS is a specialization of PA and PBS is a specialization of PB, then sequence(PAS; PBS) is a specialization of sequence(PA; PB).)
Proof: From the de nitions of sequence (PL2.3) and specialization (P.9). Theorem 6.B: task ep feasible(PE; S1)8 S1A;S2A k acc(S1; S1A)^succeeds(PE; S1A; S2A)] ) task ep feasible(PF; S2)] ) task ep feasible((sequence(PE; PF),S1). (If PE is epistemically feasible as task in S1 and the agent knows in S1 that PF will be epistemically feasible as task after every successful completion of PE, then sequence(PE; PF) is epistemically feasible as task in S1.) Proof: From de nition of epistemic feasibility as a task (EF.4) we can infer:
There exists a plan PES such that in every world S1A accessible from S1, PES is a specialization of PE and PES is executable. For every pair of worlds S1A; S2A such that S1A is accessible from S1 and PE succeeds over S1A; S2A], there exists a plan pfs(PF; S2A) such that in every world S2B accessible from S2A, pfs(PF; S2A) is a specialization of PF in S2B and is executable in S2B.
Let I be the set of all intervals S2A; S3A] satisfying the following conditions: there exists an S1A that is knowledge accessible from S1; PES executes over S1A; S2A]; and pfs(PF; S2A) executes over S2A; S3A]. Let PFS be the plan corresponding to I (axiom P.1). Let PS = sequence(PES; PFS). Now, by construction, PES is executable in every situation S1A accessible from S1. By construction, for every such S1A, and for every S2A such that PES succeeds over S1A; S2A], PFS is executable. Therefore, by theorem 6.1, PS is executable in every such S1A. By lemma 6.24, PS is a specialization of sequence(PE; PF). Therefore, by de nition EF.4, PS is epistemically feasible as a task.2 3.7 Su ciency of Moore's rules for conditionals
In this section we will show the following two versions of Moore's su cient condition for the epistemic feasibility of conditionals: (rule 2 of section 2.2):
Rule 2 for executability: If either (a) it is known that Q holds in S and PA is executable in S; or (b) it is known that Q does not hold in S and PB is executable in S then the plan \if(Q; PA; PB)" is executable in S1.
Rule 2 for epistemic feasibility as task: If either (a) it is known that Q holds in S and PA is epistemically feasible as task in S; or Lemma 6.10:
:succeeds(p,s1,S2)^corresponds(s1,S2,S1A; S2A)] ) :succeeds(p,S1A; S2A). (If p does not succeed over s1,S2] , then the agent knows in S2 that it has not succeeded.)
Proof: Let SM be any situation between s1 and S2. Let SMA be the situation between S1A
and S2A corresponding to SM, as in lemma 6.6. Since p does not succeed over s1,S2], it must be the case that either (1) pa does not succeed over s1,SM] or (2) pa does succeed over s1,SM] but pb does not succeed over SM; S2]. In the former case, since pa is executable in s1, the agent will know in SM that pa has not succeeded; thus, pa does not succeed over s1,SM]. In the latter case, since pb is executable after any successful execution of pa, the agent will know in S2 that pb has not succeeded over SM; S2]; thus, pb will not succeed over SMA; S2A]. In either case, then p does not succeed over S1A; S2A].
Lemma 6.11:
:error(S2)^next step(E,p,s1,S2)^corresponds(s1,S2; S1A; S2A)] ) next step(E,p,S1A; S2A).
(If E is a next step of p after s1,S2], then the agent knows in S2 that E is a next step.)
Proof: By lemma 6.3, there are two cases to be considered:
Case I: pa begins over s1,S2] and E is a next step of pa after s1,S2]. By the executability of pa in s1, the agent knows in S2 that E is a next step of pa after s1,S2]; that is, E is a next step of pa after S1A; S2A]. Therefore, by lemma 6.3, E is a next step of p after S1A; S2A]; that is, the agent knows in S2 that E is a next step of p.
Case II. pa succeeds over s1,SM]; pb begins over SM; S2]; and E is a next step of pb after SM; S2]. Let SMA be the situation between S1A and S2A corresponding to SM (Lemma 6.6). By the executability of pa, the agent knows in SM that pa has succeeded; that is, pa succeeds over S1A; SMA]. Since pb is executable after a successful execution of pa, the agent knows in S2 that E is a next step of pb after SM; S2]; that is, E is a next step of pb after SMA; S2A]. Thus, by lemma 6.3, E is a next step of p after S1A; S2A].
Lemma 6.12:
begins(p,s1,S2)^corresponds(s1,S2; S1A; S2A)] ) next step(E,p,S1A; S2A) ) next step(E,p,s1,S2)]. (The possibility that E is a next step of p after s1,S2] is consistent with what the agent knows in S2 only if E is indeed a next step of p after s1,S2].)
Proof: By lemma 6.3, there are two cases to consider.
Case I: pa begins over S1A; S2A] and E is a next step of pa after S1A; S2A]. Since pa is executable in s1, and S1A; S2A] corresponds to s1,S2], it follows that E must be a next step of pa after s1,S2].
Case II: pa succeeds over S1A; SMA], pb begins over SMA; S2A], and E is a next step of pb after SMA; S2A]. Let SM be the situation in s1,S2] corresponding to SMA, as in lemma 6.8. Since pa is executable in s1, pa must succeed over s1,SM]. Since pb is executable in SM, E must be a next step of pb after SM; S2]
In either case, E is a next step of p after s1,S2].
Lemma 6.13:
Plan p is executable in s1.
Proof: Combining lemmas 6.8 through 6.12 with the de nition of executability (EF.1). Theorem 6.A: corresponds(S1; S2; S1A; S2A) ) k acc(S1; S1A). (If interval S1A; S2A] corresponds to interval S1; S2] then S1A is knowledge accessible from S1.) Proof: By induction on the length of the interval S1; S2], using the de nition of corresponds (CO.1 -CO.3) and the axiom of memory (K.4). Lemma 6.6: corresponds(S1; S2; S1A; S2A)^S1 SM S2] ) 9 SMA corresponds(S1; SM; S1A; SMA)^corresponds(SM; S2; SMA; S2A). (If interval S1A; S2A] corresponds to interval S1; S2] then each situation SM in S1; S2] has a corresponding situation SMA in S1A; S2A].)
Proof: From lemmas 6.4 and 6.5, using the de nition of \corresponding" intervals as knowledge accessible intervals covering the same events (CO.3).
Lemma 6.7: corresponds(S1; S2; S1A; S2A)^S1A SMA S2A] ) 9 SM corresponds(S1; SM; S1A; SMA)^corresponds(SM; S2; SMA; S2A). (If interval S1A; S2A] corresponds to interval S1; S2], then each situation SMA in S1A; S2A] has a corresponding situation SM in S1; S2].)
Proof: Using lemma 6.4, let SM be the situation parallel to SMA. By lemma 6.5, there is some situation SMA 0 in S1A; S2A] which corresponds to SM; by the uniqueness condition in lemma 6.4, this can only be SMA.
To simplify the statements of the remaining lemmas, let pa, pb, and p be plans and s1 be a situation such that: p = sequence(pa,pb).
:error(s1). executable(pa,s1). 8 S2 succeed(pa,s1,S2) ) executable(pb,S2).
Lemma 6.8:
:error(S2) ) :next step(fail,p,s1,S2). (Failing is never a next step of p.) Proof: Let E be a next step of p after s1,S2]. By lemma 6.3, E is always either a next step of pa after s1,S2] or a next step of pb after SM; S2] where pa succeeds over s1,SM]. In the former case, E cannot be fail since pa is executable in s1 (EF.1). In the latter case, E cannot be fail, since pb is executable following every successful completion of pa.
Lemma 6.9: succeeds(p,s1,S2)^corresponds(s1,S2,S1A; S2A)] ) succeeds(p,S1A; S2A). (If p succeeds over s1,S2], then the agent knows in S2 that it has succeeded.) Proof: If p has succeeded over s1,S2] then, by lemma 6.1, pa succeeds over s1,SM] and pb succeeds over SM; S2]. By the executability of pa, the agent knows in SM that pa has succeeded; that is, pa succeeds in every interval corresponding to s1,SM]. By the executability of pb after the execution of pa, the agent knows in S2 that pb has succeeded; that is, pb succeeds in every interval corresponding to SM; S2]. By lemma 6.6, every interval corresponding to s1,S2] consists of an interval corresponding to s1,SM] followed by one corresponding to SM; S2]. Therefore, every interval corresponding to s1,S2] consists of a successful execution of pa followed by a successful execution of pb.
Su ciency of Moore's rules for sequences
In this section we will show the following two versions of Moore's su cient condition for the epistemic feasibility of sequences (rule 1 of section 2.2): Rule 1 for executability: If (a) PA is executable in S1; and (b) after any completion of PA, PB will be executable; then the plan \sequence(PA; PB)" is executable in S1. (Note that Moore's condition that (b) be known in S1 is not needed for executability.) Rule 1 for epistemic feasibility as task: If (a) PA is epistemically feasible as a task in S1; and (b) it is known in S1 that, after PA completes, PB will be epistemically feasible as a task; then the plan \sequence(PA; PB)" is epistemically feasible in S1.
Lemma 6.1: succeeds(sequence(PA; PB),S1; S2) , 9 SM succeeds(PA; S1; SM)^succeeds(PB; SM; S2). (sequence(PA; PB) succeeds if rst PA succeeds and then PB succeeds.)
Proof: From the de nition of the execution of a sequence (PL2.3), the de nition of success (P.2), and the fact that error is irrevocable (P.15).
Lemma 6.2:
begins(sequence(PA; PB),S1; S2) , begins(PA; S1; S2) _ 9 SM succeeds(PA; S1; SM)^begins(PB; SM; S2)]. (sequence(PA; PB) begins over an interval if either PA begins over the interval or a successful completion of PA is followed by a beginning of PB. Note that these two disjuncts may not be mutually exclusive if PA is indeterminate.) Proof: From the de nitions (PL2.3, P.2, P.3) and the fact that error is irrevocable (P.15.) Lemma 6.3:
:error(S2) ) next step(E,sequence(PA; PB),S1; S2) , next step(E; PA; S1; S2) _ 9 SM succeeds(PA; S1; SM)^next step(E; PB; SM; S2)]].
(The next step of sequence(PA; PB) after S1; S2], assuming S2 is not an error state, is either a next step of PA after S1; S2] or a next step of PB after SM; S2], where SM is the end of a successful completion of PA. Again, if PA is indeterminate, then these two are not necessarily mutually exclusive.) Proof: From the de nitions (PL2.3, P.2, P.4) and the fact that error is irrevocable (P.15.) Lemma 6.4: same events(S1; S2; S1A; S2A)^S1 SM S2] ) 9 1 SMA same events(S1; SM; S1A; SMA)^same events(SM; S2; SMA; S2A). (If intervals S1; S2] and S1A; S2A] cover the same sequence of events, then each situation SM in S1; S2] has a parallel situation SMA in S1A; S2A].)
Proof: Using the de nition of same events (CO.1, CO.2) and making an argument by induction on the length of the interval S1; S2].
Lemma 6.5: Theorem 4: 8 S1A k acc(S1; S1A) ) determinate(P; S1A)]] ) task ep feasible(P; S1) , dep feasible(P; S1). (If plan P is known to be determinate, then it is epistemically feasible as a task if and only if it is epistemically feasible.) Proof: From lemmas 4.1, 4.4.2.
Reduction for omniscient agent
In this section we show that for an omniscient agent, plan P is executable if and only if it is necessarily feasible; and P is feasible as a task if and only if it is possibly feasible.
We begin by de ning an omniscient agent as one for whom the only situation accessible from S is S itself. Since we are not explicitly representing agents, \omniscience" becomes a propositional atom. Proof: Given the omniscience condition, \corresponds(S1; S2; S1A; S2A)" reduces to \S1 = S1A^S2 = S2A" (CO.3), and the biconditionals in de nition EF.1 thus become trivial. De nition EF.1 thus boils down to executable(P; S1) , 8 S2 begins(P; S1; S2) ) :next step(fail,P; S1; S2) It is easily shown that this is equivalent to the de nition of necessary physical feasibility, given the frame and causal axioms on the error condition (P.14, P.16), that state that error comes about if and only if a fail action is executed; and given the fact that execution takes place over nite intervals (P.12, T.8), so that, in any execution with a failure there must be a rst failure.
Lemma 5.1: pp feasible(P; S) , 9 PD specialization(PD; P; S)^np feasible(PD; S). (A plan is possibly physically feasible just if it has a specialization that is necessarily physically feasible.)
Proof: Let S P = f S1; S2] j succeeds(P; S1; S2) g be the set of all intervals over which P succeeds. Since P is possibly feasible in S, S P contains an interval starting in S (P.8). By axiom P.1, there is a plan whose extension is S P ; that is, a plan PD such that PD executes over an interval just if P succeeds over that interval. Then PD satis es the conditions of the lemma. Proof: Using the fact that the knowledge accessibility relation is just identity and that executability is just necessary feasibility, the condition for the epistemic feasibility of P as task reduces to the statement that there is a necessarily feasible specialization of P. By lemma 5.1, this is equivalent to the condition that P be possibly physically feasible.
corresponding to a beginning from SB. Therefore, given the condition (part of the de nition of executability EF.1), \The intervals corresponding to a particular beginning of P from SB are either all or none successful executions of P and all have the same next steps," this same condition must hold for the intervals corresponding to the matching beginning of P from SA. Moreover, by lemma 3.1, the condition that \fail" is never a next step of P must hold for executions beginning from SA if it holds for executions beginning from SB. Thus, all the conditions of executability (EF.1) are met.2.
Reduction for determinate plans
In this section we show that, if plan P is known in S to be determinate in S, P is epistemically feasible if and only if P is feasible as a task.
Lemma 4.1: dep feasible(P; S1) ) task ep feasible(P; S1)] (If determinate plan P is epistemically feasible then it is epistemically feasible as a task.)
Proof: Choosing P as its own specialization PC, it is trivial to check that the conditions of de nition EF.4 are satis ed.
Lemma 4.2:
determinate(P; S1)^specialization(PS; P1; S1)] ) executes(P; S1; S2) , executes(PS; S1; S2)].
(If PS is a specialization of P starting in S1, then they occur over the same interval S1; S2].) Proof: From the de nitions of determinate and specialization (P.5,P.9). Lemma 4.3: 8 S1A;S2A k acc(S1; S1A) ) executes(PE; S1A; S2A) , executes(PF; S1A; S2A)]] ) executable(PE; S1) , executable(PF; S1)] (If it is known that PE executes from the current state if and only if PF does, then PE is executable if and only if PF is.)
Proof: For any S2 > S1, let S1A; S2A] be any interval corresponding to S1; S2]. By the axiom of memory, S1A is knowledge accessible from S1. Therefore it is easily checked that PF begins over S1; S2] i PE does; E is a next step for PF after S1A; S2A] i it is a next step for PE; PF succeeds over S1A; S2A] i PE succeeds.
The result then follows from the de nition of executability (EF.1).
It may be noted that Lemma 4.3 is the formal statement of rule 4 of section 1 for executability.
Lemma 4.4:
task ep feasible(P; S1)^ 8 S1A k acc(S1; S1A) ) determinate(P; S1A)]] ) dep feasible(P; S1).
(If P is epistemically feasible as a task in S1 and P is known to be determinate in S1 then P is epistemically feasible in S1.)
Proof: By de nition EF.4, there is a plan PC that is known to be a specialization of P in S1
and that is known to be executable in S1. By lemma 4.2, PC and P execute over the same intervals starting in situations knowledge accessible from S1. By lemma 4.3, since PC is epistemically feasible in each such situation, so is P. Thus, by de nitions EF.2 and EF.3, P is epistemically feasible.
Primitives same phys(S1; S2) | Predicate. Situations S1 and S2 are physically the same. knowledge independent(P) | Predicate. Plan P is knowledge independent. know more(S1; S2) | Predicate. The agent knows more in situation S1 than in S2.
De nitions.
C.1 knowledge independent(P) , 8 S1A;S1B;S2A;S2B same phys(S1A; S1B)^same events(S1A; S2A; S1B; S2B)] ) executes(P; S1A; S2A) , executes(P; S1B; S2B)]. (De nition of knowledge independence: P is knowledge independent if given two intervals with physically the same starting point and the same sequence of events, either both or neither are executions of P.) C.2 know more(SA; SB) , 8 SC k acc(SA; SC) ) k acc(SB; SC).
(De nition of knowing more: The agent knows more in SA than in SB if the situations accessible in SA are a subset of those accessible in SB.) Axioms C.3 same phys(S; S). same phys(SA; SB) ) same phys(SB; SA). same phys(SA; SB)^same phys(SB; SC) ) same phys(SA; SC). (Physical sameness is an equivalence relation.) C.4 same phys(SA; SB) ) error(SA) , error(SB)].
(Two situations physically the same have the same value of the error uent.) C.5 same phys(S1A; S1B)^S1A < S2A] ) 9 S2B same events(S1B; S2B)^same phys(S1B; S2B).
(If S1B is physically the same as S1A then any sequence of events feasible in S1A is also feasible in S1B and the two resultant situations are physically the same.) C.6 same phys(S1A; S1B)^know more(S1A; S1B)^same events(S1A; S2A; S1B; S2B)] ) know more(S2A; S2B).
(If the agent knows more in S1A than in S1B but the two situations are physically the same, then, after the passage of the same sequence of events, the agent will still know more in the situation after S1A than in the situation after S1B.)
To prove: same phys(SA; SB)^knowledge independent(P)k now more(SA; SB)^executable(P; SB)] ) executable(P; SA). (In two physically identical situations, the more you know, the more knowledge-independent plans are executable.) Table 12 : Axioms of knowledge-independent physics and plans To state these conditions formally, we introduce the predicate \same phys(S1; S2)", meaning that possible worlds S1 and S2 are the same in all physical respects. We will make this a primitive concept which must satisfy only the two conditions that (1) it is an equivalence relation; and (2) if two worlds are the same physically, then the value of the \error" uent is the same. (For some purposes, it may be desirable or convenient to de ne two situations to be physically the same i all uents have the same value in the two situations.) We de ne an agent as \knowing more" in SA than in SB if the worlds accessible from SA are a subset of those accessible from SB. Since knowledge accessibility is dual to knowledge, this condition means that what is known in SB is a subset of what is known in SA. It should be noted that this is quite a strong notion. In particular, suppose that we posit the property of negative introspection, that if the agent does not know , then he knows that he does not know . In such a logic, it is impossible for an agent to know strictly more in one situation than in another, since, if he knows in SA but not in SB, then he knows that he does not know in SB but not in SA. Similarly, the strength of this notion means that the monotonicity property for epistemic feasibility as a task is trivial. To say that P is epistemically feasible as a task in SB means that the agent knows the fact \Plan PC is a specialization of P and is executable" in SB. If he knows more in SA than in SB then he must know the same fact \Plan PC is a specialization of P and is executable" in SA. Table 12 gives the formal statement of the axioms we need and of the result to be proven.
Lemma 3.1:
same phys(S1A; S1B)^knowledge independent(P)] ) 8 S2A>S1A 9 S2B same events(S1A; S2A; S1B; S2B)^ succeeds(P; S1A; S2A) , succeeds(P; S1B; S2B)]^ begins(P; S1A; S2A) , begins(P; S1B; S2B)]^ next step(E; P; S1A; S2A) , next step(E; P; S1B; S2B)].
(If S1A and S1B are physically the same and P is knowledge independent, then the successful completions, beginnings, and next steps of P starting in S1A match those starting in S1B.)
Proof: By C.5, the same sequences of events are feasible and lead to physically identical results, which, by C.4, includes the same value of the error uent. By C.1, the execution intervals of P must therefore match. The result then follows from the de nitions of succeeds, begins, and next step (P.2, P.3, P.4).
Lemma 3.2:
know more(S1A; S1B)^same events(S1A; S2A; S1B; S2B)ĉ orresponds(S1A; S2A; S1C; S2C)] ) corresponds(S1B; S2B; S1C; S2C).
(If the agent knows more in S1A than in S1B then after the passage of a xed series of events, there are more intervals corresponding to S1B; S2B] than to S1A; S2A]).
Proof: By C.6, every world accessible from S1A is also accessible from S2A. The result then follows from the de nition of \corresponds" (CO.3) together with the fact that \same events" is an equivalence relation on intervals (CO.1, CO.2).
Theorem 3:
same phys(SA; SB)^knowledge independent(P)k now more(SA; SB)^executable(P; SB)] ) executable(P; SA). (In two physically identical situations, the more you know, the more knowledge-independent plans are executable.) Proof: By lemma 3.2, the intervals corresponding to a beginning from SA are a subset of those Proof: From the frame axiom on not knowing phone numbers (B.1), the de nition of s2 (lemma 2.5), the fact that the agent does not originally know Ernie's number (B.5), and the fact that looking up Fred's number is not the same as looking up Ernie's number (B.2 and B.4). Lemma 2.10: 9 S2A k acc(s2,S2A)^dial(numberq(ernie,S2A)) 6 = dial(numberq(ernie,s2)). (There is a possible world S2A which is knowledge accessible from s2 such that dialing Ernie's number in S2A is di erent from in s2. That is, the agent does not know in s2 what action is dialing Ernie's number.)
Proof: From the de nition of \know val" (K.3), the fact that dialing two di erent numbers is two di erent actions (A.3), and the fact that the agent does not know Ernie's number in s2 (lemma 2.9). Lemma 2.11: 9 S1A;S2A;E corresponds(s1,s2,S1A; S2A)^next step(E,py,s1,s2)^:next step(E,py,S1A; S2A). (There is an interval S1A; S2A] corresponding to s1,s2] such that the next step of py after s1,s2] is not a next step of py after S1A; S2A].)
Proof: From the axiom of memory (K.4), together with lemmas 2.8 and 2.10. Lemma 2.12:
:executable(py,s1).
(Plan py is not executable in s1.)
Proof: From lemmas 2.6 and 2.12 together with the de nition of executability (EF.1). 
Monotonicity with respect to knowledge
We next prove that, under suitable assumptions, the more an agent knows the more plans are executable. (Throughout this section, we will use the phrase \A is more than B" to mean \A is a (possibly improper) superset of B".)
To justify this conclusion, we need to impose three conditions. First, we must restrict attention to knowledge-independent plans; that is, plans whose execution conditions are independent of the knowledge of the agent. 12 A plan like, \If you know who was the rst President then raise him from the dead else wave a ag," is executable only if you do not know who was the rst President; we must therefore exclude these.
Second, we must assume that what an agent knows does not a ect physical laws. Speci cally, we must assume that whether a given sequence of physical actions is feasible is does not depend on what the agent knows. If it were the case that putting A onto C were feasible only if the agent did not know who was the rst President, then the desired result would not hold.
Third, we must assume that knowing more initially cannot lead to knowing less later, other things being equal. If the world were such that looking up Ernie's number caused one to know Ernie's number only if one did not previously know who was the rst President, then the plan \sequence(look up Ernie's number; dial Ernie's number)" would be feasible only if the agent did not know who was the rst President.
(Plan py executes if the agent rst looks up Fred's number and then dials Ernie's number.)
Proof: Analogous to lemma 1.4. Lemma 2.2: :error(S1)^executes(py,S1; S2)] ) :error(S2). (Executing py does not bring about the error state.)
Proof: Analogous to Lemma 1.8. Lemma 2.3: begins(py,S1; S2) , :error(S1)^ S1 = S2 _ result(S1,look up number(fred),S2) _ executes(py,S1; S2)]].
(The only beginnings of the execution of py are the null beginning; the execution of the rst step of py; and the execution of all of py.)
Proof: Analogous to lemma 1.10.
Lemma 2.4:
:error(S1) ) next step(E,py,S1; S2) , S1 = S2^E=look up number ( (Looking up X's number is a di erent action from looking up Y 's number if X 6 = Y .) B.3 N1 6 = N2 ) dial(N1) 6 = dial(N2).
(Dialing N1 and dialing N2 are di erent actions if N1 6 = N2.) B.4 ernie 6 = fred. B.5 :know val(numberq(ernie),s1).
(In situation s1, the agent does not know Ernie's number). B.6 py=sequence(pya,pyb). pya = prim action(look up number(fred)). pyb = prim uent(dialq(numberq(ernie))).
(De nition of symbols denoting pieces of the plan.) B.7 :error(s1).
To prove: :dep feasible(py,s1). (The plan is not epistemically feasible.) 
Negative result
We wish to show that the plan. \Look up Fred's phone number; dial Ernie's phone number," is not epistemically feasible. The domain is the same as in the previous section. The additional symbols and axioms needed are shown in table 11. Lemma 2.1: executes(py,S1; S2) , 9 SM result(S1,look up number(fred),SM)^result(SM,dial(numberq(ernie,SM)),S2).
(After each beginning of px, the agent knows whether it has succeeded.) Proof: Combining lemmas 1.10, 1.15, and 1.16. Lemma 1.18:
:error(SA)^:error(SB)] ) next step(E,px,SA; SA) , next step(E,px,SB; SB)].
(The rst step(s) of px is the same in all possible worlds.)
Proof: By lemma 1.11, looking up Ernie's number is always the only rst step of px. Lemma 1.19:
:error(S1A)^result(S1A,look up number(ernie),S2A)ĉ orresponds(S1A; S2A; S1B; S2B)] ) next step(E,px,S1A; S2A) , next step(E,px,S1B; S2B) Proof: By the de nition of \corresponds" (CO.1, CO.2, CO.3), look up number(ernie) executes over S1B; S2B] as well. By lemma 1.11, the only next step of px after S1A; S2A] is dialing the value of Ernie's number in S2A, and the only next step of px after S1B; S2B] is dialing the value of Ernie's number in S2B. By causal rule A.5, the value of Ernie's number is the same in all worlds accessible from S2A; hence, it is the same in S2A as in S2B (A.1, CO.3). Thus, there is one action which is the unique next step of px both after S1A; S2A] and after S1B; S2B]. Lemma 1.20: succeeds(px,S1; S2) ) :9 E next step(E,px,S1; S2). (There is no next step of px after it succeeds.) Proof: Immediate from lemma 1.11, together with lemmas 1.4, 1.9, 1.14. Lemma 1.21:
begins(px,S1A; S2A)^corresponds(S1A; S2A; S1B; S2B)] ) 8 E next step(E,px,S1A; S2A) , next step(E,px,S1B; S2B). begins(px,S1; S2) ) :next step(fail,px, S1; S2). (\Fail" is never the next step of the plan.) Proof: From lemma 1.11 and axom A. Proof: From lemma 1.4, which characterizes the execution condition of px as the sequence of two determinate actions; axiom T.10, which posits that an action has a unique e ect; and the de nition of determinate, P.5. Lemma 1.13: corresponds(S1; S2; S1A; S2A) ) 8 E1;E2 9 SM result(S1; E1; SM)^result(SM; E2; S2)] , 9 SMA result(S1A; E1; SMA)^result(SMA; E2; S2A)] (If S1A; S2A] corresponds to S1; S2], then the two events E1; E2 occur over S1; S2] just if the same events occur over S1A; S2A]) Proof: From the de nition of corresponds (CO.1, CO.2, CO.3). Strictly speaking, this requires a second-order argument. Lemma 1.14:
follows(S1; S2)^follows(S2; S3) ) S1 6 = S3^: follows(S1; S3)].
(If S1, S2, and S3 are consecutive situations, then S3 is not equal to S1 and S3 does not immediately follow S1.)
Proof: From the temporal axioms T.4, T.5, T.6, and T.7. Lemma 1.15: S1 = S2 _ result(S1; E; S2)]^corresponds(S1; S2; S1A; S2A)] ) :succeeds(px,S1A; S2A). (The agent knows that he has not executed px over a null interval or over an interval with only one step.) Proof: By lemmas 1.9 and 1.4, px can only succeed over an interval with two steps. By lemma 1.13, an interval with two steps can only correspond to another interval with two steps, and by lemma 1.14, an interval with two steps cannot also be a null interval or an interval with one step. Lemma 1.16: succeeds(px,S1; S2)^corresponds(S1; S2; S1A; S2A)] ) succeeds(px,S1A; S2A). (If px is successfully executed from S1 to S2, then the agent knows that it has been successfully executed.) Proof: By lemma 1.4, if px executed from S1 to S2 then, for some middle situation SM, look up number(ernie) executed over S1; SM] and dial(n1) executed over SM; S2], where n1 = numberq(ernie,SM), Ernie's number in SM. By lemma 1.13, if S1A; S2A] corresponds to S1; S2], then there is a middle situation SMA such look up number(ernie) executes over S1A; SMA] and dial(n1) executes over SMA; S1A]. (Note that it is not necessarily the case, at this point in the argument that n1 is also Ernie's number in SMA; this has to be established.) By axiom K.4, since S2A is accessible from S2, SMA is accessible from SM. By the causal rule A.5, that one knows a number one has looked up, and the de nition of know val (K.3), the value of numberq(ernie) is the same in all worlds accessible from SM. In particular, it is the same in SMA as in SM. Thus, n1 = numberq(ernie,SMA) and dial(n1) = dialq(numberq(ernie),SMA) (A.4). Therefore, by lemma 1.4 and 1.9, px succeeds over the interval S1A; S2A]. Lemma 1.17: begins(px,S1; S2)^corresponds(S1; S2; S1A; S2A)] ) succeeds(px,S1; S2) , succeeds(px,S1A; S2A).
Proof: From the forward branching of time (T.9.a) it follows that SA must be ordered relative to S2. From the minimality of the \follows" relation (T.7), it follows that SA cannot come between S1 and S2 nor between S2 and S3. The result then follows from the de nition of (T.3). Lemma 1.6: follows(S1; S2)^follows(S2; S3)^S1 SA < SB S3^follows(SA; SB)] ) SA = S1^SB = S2] _ SA = S2^S3 = SB]]. (If S1, S2, and S3 are consecutive situations, and SA and SB are consecutive situations occurring between S1 and S3 then SA; SB] is either S1; S2] or S2; S3].) Proof: From Lemma 1.5 and axioms T.6 and T.7. Lemma 1.7: result(S1; E1; S2)^result(S2; E2; S3)^S1 SA SB S3^result(SA; EA; SB)] ) EA = E1 _ EA = E2]. (If S3 is the result from S1 of doing rst E1 then E2, and EA occurs at some time between S1 and S3, then EA is either E1 or E2.)
Proof: From Lemma 1.6 and the de nition of follows (T.1), SA; SB] is equal to either S1; S2] or S2; S3]. Since a unique event occurs during any time interval (T.11), EA must be equal either to E1 or to E2. Lemma 1.8:
:error(S1)^executes(px,S1; S2)] ) :error(S2). (Executing px does not bring about the error state.)
Proof: From lemmas 1.4 and 1.7 and the fact (A.3) that neither looking up a number nor dialing it is the failure act, it follows that no failure occurs between S1 and S2. By the frame axiom for error (P.16), error cannot come about unless a failure occurs. Lemma 1.9: succeeds(px,S1; S2) , :error(S1)^executes(px,S1; S2)]. (All executions of px are successful.)
Proof: From the de nition of succeeds (P.2) and lemma 1.8. Lemma 1.10: begins(px,S1; S2) , :error(S1)^ S1 = S2 _ result(S1,look up number(ernie),S2) _ executes(px,S1; S2)]].
(The only beginnings of the execution of px are the null beginning; the execution of the rst step of px; and the execution of all of px.)
Proof: From the de nition of begins (P.3) together with lemmas 1.4, 1.5 and 1.8.
Lemma 1.11:
:error(S1) ) next step(E,px,S1; S2) , S1 = S2^E=look up number(ernie)] _ result(S1,look up number(ernie),S2)^E=dial(numberq(ernie, (Dialing a number is always physically feasible.) A.3 8 X;N look up number(X) 6 = fail^dial(N) 6 = fail.
(Unique names assumption: Neither looking up a number nor dialing is inherently failing.) A.4 8 S;QN value(dialq(QN),S) = dial(value in(QN; S)).
(De nition of the function dialq as the natural extension of dial to uents.) A.5 8 S1;X;S2 result(S1,look up number(X),S2) ) know val(numberq(X),S2).
(Causal axiom: After you look up the number of X, you know the number of X.) A.6 px1 = prim action(look up number(ernie))p x2 = prim uent(dialq(numberq(ernie)))p x = sequence(px1,px2). (De nition of symbols denoting pieces of the plan.)
To prove: 8 S :error(S) ) dep feasible(px,S). (The plan is always epistemically feasible.) Table 10 : Positive example B. it is known in S1 that, after PA completes, PB will be epistemically feasible, then the plan \sequence(PA; PB)" is epistemically feasible in S1. VII. Su ciency of Moore's 1985] rules for conditionals (rule 2, section 1.2): If either A. it is known that Q holds in S and PA is epistemically feasible in S; or B. it is known that Q does not hold in S and PB is epistemically feasible in S then the plan \if(Q; PA; PB)" is epistemically feasible in S.
By way of comparison, in Moore's theory 1985] (VI) and (VII) are axioms (for the determinate case); (I) is easily proven; (II) can be proven if rule 1 is taken to be a necessary as well as su cient condition; (III) and (V) can probably be proven for plans within Moore's planning language (PLAN2 without indeterminacy) by induction over the form of the plan; and (VI) is not meaningful since Moore's theory deals only with determinate plans.
Positive result
We wish to show that the plan \Look up Ernie's phone number; dial Ernie's phone number," is epistemically feasible. A plausible axiomatization of the domain is given in table 10. Lemma 1.1: executes(px,S1; S2) , 9 SM executes(pxa,S1; SM)^executes(pxb,SM; S2). (px executes by rst executing the rst step and then the second step.)
Proof: From the de nition of px (A.6) and the de nition of execution of a sequence (PL2.3). Lemma 1.2: executes(pxa,S1; S2) , result(S1,look up number(ernie),S2). (The rst step pxa executes by executing the action of looking up Ernie's number.)
Proof: From the de nitions of pxa (A.6), of executing a single action plan (PL2.1), of attempting an action (P.11), and the feasibility of looking up a number (A.1) Lemma 1.3: executes(pxb,S1; S2) , result(S1,dial(numberq(ernie,S1)),S2). (The second step pxb executes by executing the action of dialing Ernie's number.)
Proof: From the de nitions of pxb (A.6), of executing a single uent plan (PL2.2), of attempting an action (P.11), of the uent function \dialq" (A.4), and the feasibility of dialing a number (A.2) Lemma 1.4: executes(px,S1; S2) , 9 SM result(S1,look up number(ernie),SM)^result(SM,dial(numberq(ernie,SM)),S2). (Plan px is executed by rst looking up Ernie's number then dialing it.)
Proof: From lemmas 1.1, 1.2, 1.3. Lemma 1.5: follows(S1; S2)^follows(S2; S3)^S1 SA S3] ) SA = S1 _ SA = S2 _ SA = S3].
(If S1, S2, and S3 are consecutive situations, and SA comes between S1 and S3. then SA is either equal to S1, to S2, or to S3.) Non-logical primitives:
dep feasible(P; S) | Determinate plan P is epistemically feasible in S (de nition 1). bep feasible(P; S) | Determinate plan P is blindly epistemically feasible in S (de nition 2). task ep feasible(P; S) | Plan P is epistemically feasible as task in S (de nition 3). executable(P; S) | Plan P is executable as task in S (de nition 5).
De nitions EF.1. executable(P; S1) , :vacuous(P; S1)8 S2 begins(P; S1; S2) ) :next step(fail,P; S1; S2)8 S1A;S2A corresponds(S1; S2; S1A; S2A) ) succeeds(P; S1A; S2A) , succeeds(P; S1; S2)]8 E next step(E; P; S1A; S2A) , next step(E; P; S1; S2)]]. (De nition 5 of executability.) EF.3. bep feasible(P; S1) , determinate(P; S1)^executable(P; S1)]. (De nition 2 of blind epistemic feasibility for determinate plans.) EF.4. dep feasible(P; S1) , 8 S1A k acc(S1; S1A) ) bep feasible(P; S1A). (De nition 1 of epistemic feasibility for determinate plans.) EF.5 task ep feasible(P; S1) , 9 PC 8 S1A k acc(S1; S1A) ) specialization(PC; P; S1A)^executable(P; S1A)]. (De nition 3 of epistemic feasibility as a task.) The gure shows part of the structure of possible worlds for the plan \sequence(look up Ernie's number; dial Ernie's number)." Initially, the situations S1, S1Z, S1A, S1B are all mutually knowledge accessible (indicated by the triple lines). In S1 and S1Z, Ernie's number is 3123; in S1A and S1B, it is 1111. The result of performing the action \lookup" is that the agent learns what Ernie's number is. Thus, situations SQA and SQB are separated from SQ and SQZ. In each of these situations therefore, the next step of the plan, \Dial Ernie's number" denotes the same action in all accessible worlds. In all worlds accessible from SQ or SQZ, it denotes the action \Dial 3123"; in all worlds accessible from SQA or SQB, it denotes the action, \Dial 1111."
Figure 5: Possible worlds structure for epistemic feasibility b.i P succeeds over S1A; S2A] if and only if it succeeds over S1; S2]; b.ii E is a next step of P after S1A; S2A] if and only if E is a next step of P after S1; S2]; and b.iii \Fail" is not a next step of P after S1; S2].
De nition 2: A plan P is blindly epistemically feasible for A in S1 if it is determinate in S1 and executable for A in S1.
De nition 1: Determinate plan P is epistemically feasible in S1 if and only if A knows in S1 that P is blindly epistemically feasible. Formally, if S2A is knowledge accessible from S1, then P is blindly epistemically feasible from S1.
De nition 3: Plan P is epistemically feasible as a task for agent A in S1 if there exists a plan P 0 such that A knows in S1 that: a. P 0 is executable for A in S1 ; and b. P 0 is a specialization of P starting in S1.
Formally, there exists P 0 such that, for any S1A, if S1A is knowledge accessible from S1 then P 0 is executable in S1A and P 0 is a specialization of P in S1A.
It may seem odd to use \executability" as the foundation of the de nitions of the other notions of epistemic feasibility, given that, as we argued in section 2.3, executability is a more arbitrary notion than the others. However, formally, this is the simplest direction to go. Moreover, it is easily veri ed that the above de nition give the same extension for the other concepts for a wide range of choices of the exact de nition of \executability". Figure 5 illustrates the structure of temporal and possible-worlds relations involved in the example of looking up a number and dialing it.
3 Some Formal Proofs from our Theory
In this section, we will illustrate the power of the theory presented in section 2 by proving a number of results:
I. Sample positive result: Under suitable assumptions, the plan \Look up Ernie's phone number; dial Ernie's phone number," is epistemically feasible. II. Sample negative result: Under assumptions similar to (I) the plan \Look up Fred's phone number; dial Ernie's phone number," is not epistemically feasible. III. Monotonicity with respect to knowledge: Under suitable assumptions, the more an agent knows, the more plans are epistemically feasible. IV. Reduction for determinate plans: If plan P is known in S to be determinate in S, P is epistemically feasible if and only if P is feasible as a task. V. Reduction for omniscient agent: For an omniscient agent, plan P is executable if and only if it is necessarily feasible; and P is feasible as a task if and only if it is possibly feasible. VI. Su ciency of Moore's 1985] rules for sequences (rule 1, section 1.2): If A. PA is epistemically feasible in S1; and Non-logical primitive:
same events(S1A; S2A; S1B; S2B) | Predicate. The same sequence of events occurs over interval S1A; S2A] as over S1B; S2B]. corresponds(S1A; S2A; S1B; S2B) | Predicate. Interval S1B; S2B] corresponds to interval S1A; S2A].
CO.1 same events(S1A; S2A; S1B; S2B) , S1A = S2A^S1B = S2B] _ 9 SMA;SMB;E same events(S1A; SMA; S2A; SMB)^result(SMA; E; S2A)r esult(SMB; E; S2B)]]. (Recursive de nition of \same events". The base case is the null sequence of events; the recursive case recurs down the last event in the sequence.) CO.2 \same events" is the minimal relation consistent with CO.1. CO.3 corresponds(S1A; S2A; S1B; S2B) , k acc(S2A; S2B)^same events(S1A; S2A; S1B; S2B)].
(De nition of \corresponds".) For the purposes of our de nitions, we need only express the agent's knowledge about the state of the plan over an interval just completed. That is, we only need to say that the agent knows \P has succeeded over S1; S2]" in the situation S2 itself, and not in any other situation. By postulating (axiom T.9) that time is forward-branching, so that each situation has a unique history leading to it, and (axiom K.4) that an agent remembers all the events that have occurred, it follows that in any situation, the agent knows the entire history of the world up to this point.
In view of these two features, it is natural to posit that the agent can identify a particular instance of a plan in terms of the sequence of events that have passed since it started. We will say that interval S1B; S2B] corresponds to interval S1A; S2A] if S2B is knowledge accessible from S2A and the same sequence of events occurs between S1B and S2B as between S1A and S2A. The axiomatic de nition of \corresponds(S1A; S2A; S1B; S2B)" is given in axioms CO.1 -CO.3, table 8.
Epistemic feasibility
We can now state the formal de nitions of epistemic feasibility. We reformulate the de nitions of section 1 below. Table 9 shows the symbolic axiomatization.
De nition 5: A plan P is executable for agent A in situation S1 if and only if a. P is non-vacuous in S1; and b. If P begins over S1; S2] and S1A; S2A] corresponds to S1; S2] then E S2A S2B S1B S1A E If S1A, S2A, and S2B are connected as shown by the solid lines, then S1B must be exists and be connected as shown by the dotted lines. Axiom K.4 relates knowledge to time. It states that an agent remembers anything he once knew and also remembers the events that have passed. (Since time structures are forward branching, there is a unique sequence of events prior to any given situation.) Speci cally it states that, if S2B is knowledge accessible from S2A, then the same event E must have preceded both situations, and the situation preceding S2B was knowledge accessible from the situation preceding S2A (Figure 4 ). Since the class of accessible situations has not increased in going from S1A to S2A, the agent has not forgotten anything, and since the two interposing events are the same, the agent knows what it is. Using the axioms of time, one can show by induction that the agent knows all prior events and always knows as much in a later state as in previous one. (Of course, the agent may become increasingly ignorant about the current state. For example, an agent may know that a pair of dice is showing twelve; if he then rolls the dice but does not look, then he will not know what the dice are showing after rolling the dice. What the axiom does guarantee is that after rolling the dice he still remembers that the dice showed twelve before he rolled the dice.) Axiom K.5 asserts that the agent always knows whether he is in the error state. This is primarily useful for deducing that he knows that he is not in the error state at the beginning of plan execution.
There is one further tricky issue in integrating our theory of plans with the possible worlds theory of knowledge. As discussed in section 2.1.1, the planning concepts \P succeeds," \P has begun," and \E is the next step of P"are all de ned relative to an interval S1; S2]. However, our language of knowledge does not allow us to express a statement like \A knows in S2 that P succeeds over S1; S2]" directly; it does not make any sense to say, \In every situation accessible from S2 it is the case that P completes over S1; S2]."
The problem, then, is to identify a particular instance of a plan over di erent time structures related by knowledge accessibility relations. In general, the cross-world identi cation problem of K.1 8 S k acc(S; S).
(Re exivity = Veridicality.) K.2 k acc(SA; SB)^k acc(SB; SC) ) k acc(SA; SC) (Transitivity = Positive introspection.) K.3 know val(Q; S) , 9 X 8 S2 k acc(S; S2) ) X=value in(S; Q).
(De nition of knowing what Q is.) K.4 result(S1A; E; S2A)^k acc(S2A; S2B)] ) 9 S1B result(S1B; E; S2B)^k acc(S1A; S1B). (Axiom of memory). K.5 k acc(SA; SB) ) error(SA) , error(SB)]. We must thus extend the notion of uent from \something whose value can change over time" to \something that could conceivably have another value." For example, in a purely temporal theory, the gravitational constant would be a logical constant. However, if we wish to describe agents who do not know the value of the gravitational constant, then it must be a uent whose value varies from one world to another.
Knowledge about past and future is expressed by combining knowledge accessibility with temporal relations. Thus, the statement, \The agent knows in S1 that, if he picks up block A, then block B will be clear," is expressed in the formula For every S2 and S3, if S2 is accessible from s1, and S3 is the result of picking up block A in S2, then block B is clear in S3. 8 S2;S3 k acc(s1,S2)^result(S2,pickup(blocka),S3) ) clear(blockb,S3). The overall structure of possible worlds consists of a number of parallel branching time-structures, connected \horizontally" by knowledge accessibility relations.
To axiomatize this theory of knowledge, we introduce the predicate \k acc(S1; S2)" (meaning situation S2 is knowledge accessible from situation S1), and posit the axioms enumerated in Table  4 .
Axioms K.1 and K.2 are purely constraints on the knowledge relation. As is well known, they generate a theory of knowledge at an instant that corresponds to the modal theory S4 Halpern and Moses, 85]. In particular, axiom K.1 corresponds to the axiom of veridicality, that if A knows then must be true, and axiom K. The de nition as a whole recurs down the structure of the plan. Item (e.1) also has an internal recursion through iterations of a loop down the time line.
Note that every execution of a plan takes at least one time unit. (The use of repeat rather than while loops is to insure this and thus avoid the problem of de ning a semantics for a while loop with an instantaneous body.)
Theory of Knowledge
We use a possible-worlds theory of knowledge Hintikka, 68] . Following Moore 1980 Moore , 1985 we identify a possible world with a situation; a possible world is one way the universe can be at an instant. To express facts about an agent's knowledge, we introduce the notion of a knowledge accessibility relation between worlds. World s2 is knowledge accessible from world s1 if, as far as the agent 11 knows in s1, the world could just as well be in s2. The statement that A knows is thus expressed by stating that holds in every accessible world; that is, no world in which is false is consistent with what is known. Thus, the statement that the agent knows in s1 that it is currently raining is expressed by stating that in every world accessible from s1 it is raining. (Figure 3) Following Hintikka 1968], we represent, \A knows in what is" using the large-scope quantication, \There is an X such that A knows that X = ." In a possible-worlds representation, this is Non-logical primitives: prim action(E) | Function mapping action E to the plan of doing E. prim uent(QE) | Function mapping QE, a uent over actions, to the plan of doing the current value of QE. sequence(P 1 . . .P k ) | Function mapping plans P 1 . . .P k to the plan of performing these in sequence. if(Q; PA; PB) | Function mapping Boolean uent Q and plans PA; PB to the plan of doing PA if Q, else PB. repeat(PA; Q) | Function mapping plan PA and Boolean uent Q to the plan of repeating PA until Q. indet(P 1 . . .P k ) | Function mapping plans P 1 . . .P k to plan of doing one of them.
Axioms:
PL2.1 executes(prim action(E),S1; S2) , attempt(E; S1; S2). PL2.2 executes(prim uent(QE),S1; S2) , attempt(value in(S1; QE),S1; S2). PL2.3 executes(sequence(PA; PB),S1; S2) , 9 SM S1 SM S2^executes(PA; S1; SM)^executes(PB; SM; S2). PL2.4 executes(if(Q; PA; PB),S1; S2) , holds(S1; Q)^executes(PA; S1; S2)] _ :holds(S1; Q)^executes(PB; S1; S2)]] PL2.5 iterates(repeat(PA; Q),S1; S2) , executes(PA; S1; S2) _ 9 SM iterates(repeat(PA; Q),S1; SM)^:holds(SM; Q)^executes(PA; SM; S2)]. PL2.6 executes(repeat(PA; Q), S1; S2) , iterates(repeat(PA; Q),S1; S2)^holds(S2; Q). PL2.7 executes(indet(PA; PB),S1; S2) , :vacuous(P A; S1)^:vacuous(PB; S1)^ executes(PA; S1; S2) _ executes(PB; S1; S2)]]. P.12 executes(P; S1; S2) ) S1 S2.
(A constraint on language semantics: Plans must execute from earlier to later times.) P.13 8 S feasible(fail,S).
(Failing can always occur.) P.14 result(S1,fail,S2) ) error(S2).
(Failing results in error.) P.15 error(S1)^S1 < S2 ) error(S2).
(Error is irrecoverable.) P.16 :error(S1)^error(S2)^S1 < S2 ] ) 9 SA;SB S1 SA < SB S2^result(SA,fail,SB).
(Frame axiom for \error": The error state is only entered as a result of executing \fail.") Table 5 : Axioms for the theory of plans
The semantics of PLAN2 can be de ned by recurring down the form of the plan. a. Let P=prim action(E). P executes over S1; S2] i E is attempted over S1; S2]. b. Let P=prim uent(QE). P executes over S1; S2] if value in(S1; QE) is attempted over S1; S2]. c. Let P=sequence(P 1 . . .P k ). P executes over S 0 ; S k ] i there exist S 1 ; S 2 . . .S k?1 such that S i?1 S i and such that P i executes over S i?1 ; S i ], for i = 1 . . .k. d. Let P=if(Q; PA; PB). P executes over S1; S2] i one of the following holds: { Q holds in S1 and PA executes over S1; S2]; or { Q does not hold in S1 and PB executes over S1; S2]. e. We de ne the semantics of the repeat loop by rst giving a recursive de nition of executing some of the iterations of a repeat loop, and then using that to de ne executing the entire loop. e.i. Let P=repeat(PA; Q). P executes some iterations over S1; S2] i one of the following holds: PA executes over S1; S2]; or For some S3 such that S1 < S3 S2, P executes some iterations over S1; S3]; Q does not holds in S3; and PA executes over S3; S2]. e.ii. Let P=repeat(PA; Q). P executes over S1; S2] i P executes some iterations over S1; S2] and Q holds in S2. f. Let P=indet(P 1 . . .P k ). P executes over S1; S2] i P i executes over S1; S2] for some i 2 1 . . .k. and none of the P i are vacuous in S1. Table 5 shows the symbolic expression of this de nition.
P.1 For any set P of nite intervals, there is a unique plan P such that executes(P; S1; S2) , S1; S2] 2 P.
(De nition 7 of \plan".) P.2 succeeds(P; S1; S2) , executes(P; S1; S2)^:error(S2).
(De nition 8 of \succeeds". Note the \extra-argument" notation in \error".) P.3 begins(P; S1; S2) , 9 S3 S1 S2 S3^executes(P; S1; S3)^:error(S2).
(De nition 9 of \begins".) P.4 next step(E; P; S1; S2) , 9 S3;S4 S1 S2 < S3 S4^result(S2; E; S3)^executes(P; S1; S4).
(De nition 10 of \next step".) P.5 determinate(P; S1) , 9 1 S2 executes(P; S1; S2). (De nition 11 of determinate.) P.6 vacuous(P; S1) , :9 S2 executes(P; S1; S2).
(De nition 12 of vacuous.) P.7 np-feasible(P; S1) , :vacuous(P; S1)^8 S2 executes(P; S1; S2) ) succeeds(P; S1; S2)].
(De nition 13 of necessary physical feasibility.) P.8 pp-feasible(P; S1) , 9 S2 succeeds(P; S1; S2).
(De nition 14 of possible physical feasibility.) P.9 specialization(PI; P; S) , :vacuous(P I; S)^8 S2 executes(PI; S1; S2) ) executes(P; S1; S2).] (De nition 15 of specialization.) P.10 completion(PC; P;S1) , specialization(PC; P; S1)^determinate(PC; S1).
(De nition 16 of completion.) P.11 attempt(E; S1; S2) , result(S1; E; S2) _ :feasible(E; S)^result(S1,fail,S2)]].
(De nition 17 of \attempting" an action.) executes(P; S1; S2) | Predicate. Plan P executes over S1; S2]. succeeds(P; S1; S2) | Predicate. Plan P succeeds over S1; S2]. begins(P; S1; S2) | Predicate. Plan P begins over S1; S2]. next step(E; P; S1; S2) | Predicate. Event E is a possible next step for P after S1; S2]. determinate(P; S) | Predicate. Plan P is determinate in S. vacuous(P; S) | Predicate. Plan P is vacuous in S. np-feasible(P; S) | Predicate. Plan P is necessarily physically feasible in S. pp-feasible(P; S) | Predicate. Plan P is possibly physically feasible in S. specialization(PR; P) | Predicate. Plan PR is a specialization of plan P. completion(PR; P) | Predicate. Plan PR is a completion of plan P. fail. | Constant. The action of failing. error. | Constant. The uent of being in error. The second planning language, PLAN2, is a simple ALGOL-like language with an indeterminacy operator. A plan is built up from primitive actions by applying recursive control structures to primitive statements. A primitive statement has either the form \prim action(E), where E is an action, or \prim uent(QE)", where QE is a uent ranging over actions. For example, in the blocks world, \puton(blocka,blockb)" denotes the action of putting block A onto block B, and \prim action(puton(blocka,blockb))" denotes the plan consisting of that single action. The term \puton q(top of(stacka),top of(stackb))" denotes the uent whose value in any situation S is the action of putting the block that is at the top of stack A in situation S onto the block that is at the top of stack B. The term \prim uent(puton q(top of(stacka),top of(stackb)))" denotes the plan consisting of that single action. Here, we construe \top of(K)" as a function mapping a stack K to a uent ranging over blocks, and we construe \puton q(Q1; Q2)" as a function mapping two uents ranging over blocks to a uent ranging over actions. 10 The control structures we will consider in PLAN2 are \sequence(P 1 . . .P k )", \if(QB; P 1 ; P 2 )", \repeat(P 1 ; QB)", meaning \repeat P 1 until QB", and \indet(P 1 . . .P k )", meaning \indetermi-nately do either P 1 or P 2 or . . .or P k ." Here P i is a subplan, and QB is a Boolean uent such as \on(blocka,blockb)" or \raining".
For example, the following plan moves all the blocks in stack A to stack C, and then all the blocks in stack B to stack C. (We assume that neither stack A nor stack B is initially empty.) sequence(repeat(prim uent(puton q(top of(stacka),top of(stackc))) empty(stacka)), repeat(prim uent(puton q(top of(stackb),top of(stackc))) empty(stackb))).
De nition 13: Plan P is necessarily physically feasible in S1 if P is non-vacuous in S1 and, for any S2, if P executes over S1; S2] then P succeeds over S1; S2]. This is equivalent to the usual notion of necessary feasibility of indeterminate plans Chapman, 87] , that every completion of the plan is feasible. Each completion corresponds to an execution; an infeasible completion corresponds to an execution that ends in failure.
De nition 14: Plan P is possibly physically feasible in S1 if there exists an S2 such that P succeeds over S1; S2].
De nition 15: Plan P 0 is a specialization of plan P in S1 if, for any S2, if P 0 executes over S1; S2], then P executes over S1; S2].
De nition 16: Plan P 0 is a completion of plan P in S1 if P 0 is determinate and is a specialization of P.
As an illustration of the above de nitions, consider the plan P0 = sequence(either(puton(a,c) puton(a,table)); puton(c,b)) executing starting in situation S0 of gure 2. P0 executes over S0,SE2] and S0,S12]. It succeeds over S0,S12]. It begins over S0,S0], S0,S1], S0,S3], and S0, S12]. The next steps of p0 after S0,S0] are puton(a,c) and puton(a,table). There is no next step after S0,S1]. The next step after S0,S3] is puton(c,b). P0 is weakly but not strongly physically feasible. P0 is non-vacuous and indeterminate. The plan \sequence(puton(a,table); puton(c,b))" is a completion of P0, since its extension is just the set f S0,S12]g , which is a subset of the extension of P0.
Finally, we de ne the concept of \attempting" an action E; that is, executing E if possible, else failing. This will be useful in de ning the semantics of plans with infeasible actions.
De nition 17: An action E is attempted over interval S1; S2] if one of the following two conditions hold:
i. E is feasible in S1, and S2 is the result of executing E in S1; or ii. E is not feasible in S1 and S2 is the result of executing \fail" in S1.
Planning languages
What remains is to de ne the conditions under which plan P executes over interval S1; S2]. We illustrate how this is done by de ning the semantics of two simple planning languages.
In the rst planning language, PLAN1, a plan is a partial ordering of steps. Each step has a content, which is an atomic action. This is similar to the representation of indeterminate plans in TWEAK Chapman, 87] , with the di erences that (i) we exclude variables and (ii) we do not assume any particular representation for the preconditions and e ects of actions or restrictions on them.
The semantics of PLAN1 are de ned in the natural way:
De nition 17: A plan P in PLAN1 is executed over interval < S 0 ; S 1 . . .S k > i for some total ordering < T 1 . . .T k > of the steps of P, the content of T i is attempted over S i?1 ; S i ]. For example, consider the plan P1 consisting of two unordered steps, W1 = puton(c,a) and W2 = puton(a,table), to be executed in situation S0 of gure 1. The total ordering <W1,W2> is formal statement will be that plan P does not execute any nite interval starting in S1. We will say that P is vacuous in S1. Thus the conditions in de nitions 1, 2, 3, and 5 that P terminate are expressed formally by requiring that P be non-vacuous. We do not distinguish here between plans that, intuitively, involve an in nite sequence of feasible actions, such as \while (true) wave a ag" and those that, intuitively, involve an in nite sequence of impossible actions, such as, \while (true) turn a gallon of water into wine"; both are consider equally vacuous.
A third issue is the fact that, in any given situation, there may be more than one active instance of a plan P. For example, let p0 be the plan \For i := 1 to 50 do: take a stone out of the basket." Let s0 be a situation in which there are 51 stones in the basket, and let the interval <s0, s1 . . .s50> be an interval in which stones are taken out of the basket one at a time. Consider now what is happening at time s50. There is an instance of p0 that started at time s0 that has just succeeded. There is also an instance of p0 that started at time s1 which has executed its rst 49 steps, and which will succeed after one more step. There are also instances of p0 that started at times s2, s3 . . .s49 which have executed 48, 47 . . .1 steps. These will be able to execute one more step, but which will not be able to succeed. Finally, there is an instance of p0 that is starting now at s50, which will execute one step and then get stuck. For this reason, the notions of \executing", \succeeding", beginning", and \next step" are all de ned relative to two situations: a starting situation and an ending or a reference situation.
Finally, it should be noted that an indeterminate plan may both succeed over S1; S2] and have a next step after S1; S2]. For instance, consider the plan \Say`Hello' two or three times." After saying \Hello" twice, the plan has succeeded; it also, at that point, has a next step of saying \Hello" a third time.
We will illustrate how the predicate \P executes over S1; S2]" can be de ned for a variety of planning languages in section 2.2.2. The de nitions of the other properties of plans in terms of execution and of the error state are straightforward; they are stated in de nitions 7-15 below, and are expressed symbolically in tables 3, 4, and 5.
De nition 7: The extension of a plan P is the set of nite intervals over which P executes. Any set of nite intervals corresponds to a plan. Two plans that execute over the same set of intervals are considered identical.
De nition 8: A plan P succeeds over S1; S2] if it executes over S1; S2] and \error" does not hold in S2.
De nition 9: A plan P begins over S1; S2] if i. For some S3 S2, P executes over S1; S3]; and ii. \error" does not hold in S2.
De nition 10: Action E is a possible next step of P after S1; S2] if i. E is feasible in S2; and ii. Let S3 be the result of executing E in S2. Then the interval S1; S3] is an initial segment of an execution of P; that is, there is an S4 such that S1 < S3 S4 and P executes over S1; S4].
De nition 11: Plan P is determinate in S1 if there exists exactly one S2 such that P executes over S1; S2].
De nition 12: Plan P is vacuous in S1 if there exists no S2 such that P executes over S1; S2].
As discussed above, plans that intuitively go into in nite loops are formally considered vacuous. 
Plans 2.2.1 General approach
The fundamental notion in our theory of planning will be the predicate \Plan P executes over interval S1; S2]." The de nition of this relation for a given plan will constitute the semantics of the plan. All other properties of plans are de ned in terms of this one.
There are a few tricky issues to be dealt with. The rst issue is the treatment of plans that require or permit the execution of an infeasible action. The approach that we will take here is analogous to standard practice in programming language semantics. If the plan speci es an infeasible action, the agent will attempt it, but will in fact execute the action \fail". 8 \Fail" is an action that is always feasible. It has the e ect of setting the Boolean uent \error" to be true. Its e ects on other uents is unde ned. 9 We posit that there is no action that sets \error" back to true. Figure 2 shows the modi ed version of the branching time line in Figure 1 .
Thus, the execution of a plan may succeed or fail. If plan P executes successfully over interval S1; S2], we will say that P succeeds over S1; S2.
A second issue is the problem of in nite loops. In our theory, execution of a plan is de ned only over nite intervals. Therefore, if, intuitively, a plan P goes into an in nite loop starting in S1, our
De nitions:
T.1 follows(S1; S2) , 9 E result(S1; E; S2).
(De nition of follows: S2 follows S1 if there is an action that turns S1 into S2.) T.2 feasible(E; S1) , 9 S2 result(S1; E; S2).
(De nition of feasible: E is feasible in S1 if there is a situation S2 that results from performing E in S1.) T.3 S1 > S2 , S2 < S1. S1 S2 , S1 < S2 _ S1 = S2. S1 S2 , S1 > S2 _ S1 = S2.
(De nition of the other order relations in terms of \precedes".)
Axioms:
T.4 S1 < S2 ) :(S2 < S1).
(Antisymmetry of \precedes".) T.5 S1 < S2^S2 < S3] ) S1 < S3.
(Transitivity of \precedes"). T.6 follows(S1; S2) ) S1 < S2.
(If S2 follows S1 then S1 precedes S2.) T.7 follows(S1; S2) ) :9 SM S1 < SM^SM < S2.
(Minimality of the \follows" relation.) T.8 The \precedes" relation is the strict transitive closure of the \follows" relation. That is, \precedes" has the minimal extension consistent with T.6 and T.5. T.9 a. S1 < S^S2 < S] ) S1 S2 _ S2 S1].
b. follows(S1; S)^follows(S2; S)] ) S1 = S2. (Forward branching of the time line. Axioms (a) and (b) are equivalent, given T.8.) T.10 result(S1; E; SA)^result(S1; E; SB) ) SA = SB.
(An event has a unique result.) T.11 result(S1; EA; S2)^result(S1; EB; S2) ) EA = EB.
(A unique event occurs over an atomic interval.) Table 2 : Axiomatization of Time
We use upper case italicized symbols for variables. Free variables are assumed to be universally quanti ed with the whole sentence as scope. The sorts of variable are indicated by their rst letter. Sorts in the temporal theory: Situations (S), actions (E), uents (Q). Non-logical symbols: S1 < S2, S1 > S2, S1 S2, S1 S2 | Predicates. The order relations. result(S1; E; S2) | Predicate. S2 results if E is performed in S1. follows(S1; S2) | Predicate. S2 is a situation immediately following S1. feasible(E; S) | Predicate. Action E is feasible in situation S. holds(S; Q) | Predicate. Fluent Q holds in situation S. value in(S; Q) | Function. The value of uent Q in situation S. actions that an agent may choose between. That is, the outarcs from a given situation correspond to those actions that are feasible in the situation. Indeed, we will take this as the de nition of feasibility of actions: (We take the time structure to be the given, and de ne other primitives in terms of it.)
De nition 6: Action E is feasible in S1 if there is an S2 which is the result of performing E in S1.
We de ne a relation on situations \S1 < S2" (read \S1 precedes S2") to be the strict transitive closure of the result relation. We posit that the time structure is forward branching; that is, the situations preceding any situation S are totally ordered. Thus \precedes" is a strict partial ordering. The other order relations ( ; >; ) are de ned in the usual way.
A uent is a parameter whose value changes over time. A Boolean uent, such as \raining", has Boolean values; other uents, such as \president(usa)" take values in other spaces (in this case, the space of people). We use the predicate \hold(S; Q)" to mean that boolean uent Q has value TRUE in situation S. We use the function \value in(S; Q)" to denote the value of non-Boolean uent Q in situation S. We will sometimes abbreviate these notations by attaching extra arguments to uents; thus, we may write \raining(S)" rather than \holds(S,raining)" or \president(usa,S)" rather than \value in (S,president(usa) )."
We shall be particularly interested in uents that range over actions. For example, the term \shake hands(president(usa))" might denote the uent whose value is the action of shaking hands with that person who is currently President. The value of this uent for situations in 1986 is the action of shaking hands with Ronald Reagan, while its value for situations in 1993 is shaking hands with Bill Clinton.
In our informal discussion, we will frequently make use of nite time intervals. For SA SB, the closed interval SA; SB] is the set of all points S such that SA S SB. This set of points is totally ordered; thus, slightly abusing notation, we will sometimes denote the interval SA; SB] in the form < S 1 = SA; S 2 . . .S k = SB > of the situations in order. Our symbolic axiomatization, however, does not use intervals, but just the two end-points.
We will say that action E is executed over interval S1; S2] i result(S1; E; S2). Tables 1 and 2 give a formal axiomatization of the temporal theory. 1. All next steps of the plan must be logically, physically, and epistemically feasible. 2. The agent must be aware of all the next steps, and aware that his knowledge is exhaustive. 3. The agent must be able to continue the plan after a beginning whether or not he could have deliberately executed it that way. We require that, whenever the agent begins the plan, he must be aware that he had begun it. 4. As long as agent can execute every action in the set of next steps, he need not be able to divide them up along the same lines as the plan. 5. We admit blind feasibility.
Some good properties enjoyed by this de nition include:
For an omniscient agent, executability reduces to necessary physical feasibility in the usual sense. (Theorem 5, section 6.5). Given suitable assumptions, the executability of plans is monotonic with respect to knowledge; the more the agent knows, the more plans are executable. (Theorem 3, section 6.3). For determinate plans, executability is equivalent to blind epistemic feasibility.
Formalization
Formalizing de nitions 1-3 above requires a theory with the following elements:
A theory of time. (Section 3.1). A theory of plans, including the de nitions of a \plan", of the \execution" and \beginning" a plan, of the \next step" of a plan, of a \determinate" plan, and of a \completion" of a plan. The general de nitions are in section 3.2.1. Section 3.2.2 gives a semantics supporting these concepts for two simple planning languages. A theory of knowledge (Section 3.3).
We use a sorted rst-order logic with set theory. In our exposition below, we will state symbolically the axioms of the theory that can be expressed without set theory; those that require set theory will be expressed only in English.
Temporal theory
We use the situation calculus McCarthy and Hayes, 69] as our temporal theory. In the situation calculus, time is construed as an directed graph whose nodes are situations (instantaneous states of the universe) and whose arcs correspond to events that transmute one situation into another. The predicate 7 \result(S1; E; S2)" will mean that event E changes situation S1 into situation S2. Figure  1 shows a small branching time structure for a blocks world scenario.
Branching time is used in the literature for a variety of di erent types of uncertainty or indeterminacy about the future; in this paper, however, we will use branching only to represent the possible away from the World Trade Center, that Fred knows that the World Trade Center is 1350 feet high, but that he does not know the heights of the Empire State Building or the Chrysler Building (1250 feet, not counting the TV tower, and 1046 feet, respectively.) Is the plan \`Take a taxi to a New York building taller than 1000 feet," to be considered inexecutable, because Fred does not know that it can be achieved by going to Empire State Building or the Chrysler Building? What about the plan \Walk in ve minutes to a New York building taller than 1000 feet," which is physically infeasible if the building is chosen to be either of the other two? What about the plan, \Go to a New York building more than 1300 feet tall," for which Fred in fact knows all the possible next steps, but does not know that his list is exhaustive? 3. Our proposed de nition says that, however the agent begins plan P, he will be able to continue it. But does this mean any beginnings whatever of P? or only if he knows that he has begun P? or only if he could have planned to begin P in the way that he has? For example, let P be the plan, \Take the train from New Haven to a city of population greater than one million; then take a taxi to the Empire State Building." Suppose that New York is the only city that the agent knows has a population greater than one million. Shall we say that the plan is executable, because, if he chooses to execute it, he will certainly plan to go to New York? Suppose we know that at the Philadelphia train station is a sign saying \Welcome to Philadephia; population > 4,000,000." Shall we say that the plan is not executable, because he may get o at Philadelphia pursuing some other plan, realize that he has begun P, and attempt to nish P? 4. Consider the following case: Edith is sitting with Jack and Algernon. She does not know who is older. P is the plan, \Either speak to the older of the two or speak to the younger of the two." Edith knows, of course, that this plan is equivalent to \Either speak to Jack or speak to Algernon." Is P executable, because it is equivalent to an executable plan? Or is P inexecutable, because if she chooses either branch, she ends up with an inexecutable plan? 5. In the case of determinate plans, we made a distinction between plans that the agent knows are feasible, and those that are blindly feasible. How do we make that choice in this context?
Not wishing to drag the reader through a dozen di erent alternate de nitions, and lacking a clearly de ned model or intuition, we choose a single de nition that is easily expressed in our formal language and that has \nice" formal properties. Its de nition in the formal language is, in face, almost exactly the same as the formal de nition of \blind epistemic feasibility", dropping the condition of determinacy and widening the notion of \the next step of the plan" to \the set of next steps of the plan."
De nition 5: 6 A plan P is executable for agent A at time T if and only if, a. P terminates when executed starting in T; and b. After any beginning of the execution of P starting in T, b.i A will know whether P has successfully nished; b.ii A will know of every action whether or not it is a next step of P; and b.iii All the next steps of P are feasible.
De nition 5 is a comparatively narrow one, though not the narrowest possible. It gives the following solutions to the issues raised above:
Clearly, under practically any circumstances where one can say that the agent knows enough to carry out P, this plan will satisfy the conditions for P 0 in de nition 3. 5 As we shall elaborate below (section 2.2), our notion of plans is rich enough to include T2(P) for any plan P.
The other objection to de nition 3 is that it does not capture the concept of an \executable" plan, but rather addresses a di erent, much weaker notion. A plan should be something that the agent can simply execute, not something that requires the agent to think long and deeply about how to carry it out. In fact, as far as de nition 3 is concerned, \achieve(G)" is a perfectly ne plan as long as the agent can gure out how to achieve G. What is wanted is the notion of a plan that the agent can execute one step at a time without thinking ahead.
This view of executability is supported not only by intuition but also by all previous work on indeterminate plans. The standard de nition in the literature (e.g. Chapman, 87] ) is that an indeterminate plan is physically feasible if every completion is feasible. De nition 3 above admits plans that are not even considered physically feasible. The indeterminate plan \Either wave a ag or turn water into wine" is physically infeasible, because the completion \Turn water into wine" is impossible; however, it satis es de nition 3, because the agent can choose to pick the completion \Wave a ag."
More or less, we are aiming for a de nition roughly along the following lines:
Plan P is executable for agent A at time T if, after each beginning of P starting in A, A knows how to perform all the possible next steps of P.
(One might suppose that the complementary notion to de nition 3 would be \All completions of P are epistemically feasible." However, this condition can only be achieved by omniscient agents. For example, let P be the plan \do either A or B" and let P 0 be the plan, \if Q then do A else do B." Then P 0 is a completion of P; however, P 0 is only epistemically feasible if Q is known.) Unfortunately, there is an inherent clash between the notion of executability that we are aiming toward here and the context of intelligent agents. After all, we are trying to de ne epistemic feasibility relative to an agent who knows something and can reason; in fact, we will idealize the agent as being able to do arbitrary deductive reasoning instantaneously. The notion of executability we are looking for, by contrast, assumes that the agent is not willing to look further ahead than his nose; he will blindly try to execute the next step of the plan whatever it is. Thus, we are in a certain sense trying to force the agent to be stupider than he actually is. It is not clear that there is any particularly natural way to do this.
The result of this conceptual incoherence is that there are a variety of choices to be made in de ning the above notion of executability and there is no clear model or intuition to justify one choice over another. For example, 1. Is the agent allowed to exclude next steps that are logically, physically, or epistemically impossible, and to choose only among the next steps that are possible? That is, are we excluding the agent only from choosing steps on the basis of reasoning about the future, or are we also excluding from choosing steps on the basis of reasoning about the present? 2. Is the agent obliged to know about all the possible next moves? If so, is he obliged to know that the next moves he is aware of are, in fact, exhaustive? If not, is it necessary that the possible next moves he is unaware of be feasible? For example, suppose that Fred is one block
In either case, she can determine that if she rst looks up Ernie's number and then dials it, she will be able to nish the plan successfully. Thus these plans are epistemically feasible as tasks. In any of these cases, Edith knows that the determinate plan \sequence(look up Ernie's number; dial Ernie's number)" is epistemically feasible and is a way to carry out the speci ed indeterminate plan. This suggests the following de nition, a generalization of rule 4 of the previous section:
De nition 3: Plan P is epistemically feasible as a task for agent A at time T if there exists a determinate plan P 0 such that: a. P 0 is epistemically feasible for A at T; and b. A knows in T that an execution of P 0 starting in T will constitute an execution of P starting in T.
In general, if P 0 is a determinate plan such that an execution of P 0 starting in T constitutes an execution of P, we will say that P 0 is a completion of P. The form of P 0 may be more complex than the form of P. For example, if P is the plan \for I := 1 to 100 do either A or B", then one completion of P is for I := 1 to 100 do if the relative humidity in Des Moines, rounded to the nearest integer, is prime then do A else do B.
There are two possible objections to de nition 3: rst, that it is too narrow, and, second, that it is too broad. We will address them in turn.
It may seem that the de nition requires too much. Why should the agent be obliged to generate from the beginning a plan P 0 that will take him all the way through P? Would it not be more in the spirit of de nition 1 to require only that he be able to see his way one step at a time?
The answer to this objection is that the de nition presumes a very general sense of \plan". When we come to the formalization of this theory, we will de ne a plan extensionally as a set of intervals, and then we can use the comprehension and choice axioms of set theory to guarantee the existence of all sorts of plans. For the moment, we will illustrate the richness of the class of plans as follows. We begin by de ning recursively the notion of being on the right track to nish a plan successfully.
De nition 4: Agent A is on the right track for plan P at time T if either a. A knows at T that P has nished successfully at T; or b. There is an action E such that A knows that, if he performs E, then he will (recursively) be on the right track for P. Such an action will be called a right move of P for A at the time.
Furthermore, we posit the existence of a choice function, that, given a particular set of actions, returns one speci c element of the the set. For example, if the set of all actions can be well-ordered, then the choice function map a set of actions AA into the element lowest in the well-ordering.
We now de ne a transformation T2(P) that takes an arbitrary plan P into a particular completion of P. For any plan P, T2(P) is the plan while (P has not nished successfully) do (choice-function(the right moves of P)) will call such a plan blindly epistemically feasible; if the agent is presented with the plan and follows it in blind faith, he will get through it. The de nition di ers from de nition 1 only in dropping the outer knowledge condition:
De nition 2: A determinate plan P is blindly epistemically feasible for A at T if and only if a. At each stage of the execution of P, A will know whether P has successfully nished; b. At each stage of the execution of P, if P has not successfully nished, then A will know which speci c action constitutes the next step of P; and c. P eventually terminates.
De nition 1: (revised) A determinate plan P is epistemically feasible for A at T if and only if A knows at T that P is blindly epistemically feasible.
This distinction becomes more important and richer in the context of indeterminate plans.
Indeterminate Plans
An indeterminate plan is one that can be executed in more than one way. Indeterminate plans were introduced into the AI literature in NOAH Sacerdoti, 75], and have since been studied extensively (e.g. Chapman, 87] .) The indeterminacy may involve a partial ordering on the steps of the plan, or arguments to actions that are constrained but not fully bound, or simply options between two choices. In executing an indeterminate plan, there may be several options for the next step of the plan at a given moment. In some cases, some of the options at a given moment may be executable, while others may be epistemically infeasible, physically impossible, or logically impossible. (A logically impossible action is one that refers to a non-existent object, such as \Send a letter to the King of France.") De ning epistemic feasibility is substantially trickier, both technically and conceptually, for indeterminate plans than for determinate plans. There is more than one concept to be considered. We will begin by considering a version of epistemic feasibility that turns out to be the clearest conceptually, though not the most natural intuitively. The basic idea is this: Let us view an indeterminate plan P as a task that has been assigned, rather than as a guideline to follow. Some taskmaster has told the agent \Carry out a series of actions that conforms to P" and the agent must gure out some way of doing so. If the agent can gure out a way of performing P, then we will say that P is epistemically feasible as a task. For example, suppose that Aunt Edith is assigned the plan, \sequence(look up anyone you choose in the directory; dial Ernie's number)". Edith can gure out that if she chooses to look up Ernie's number as the rst step, then she will be able to carry out the plan. This plan is therefore epistemically feasible for Edith as a task; that is, Edith knows enough so that she can be sure that she will be able to perform it.
Other types of indeterminacy work the same way. Suppose that Edith is given either the plan sequence(either(sing Yankee Doodle, look up Ernie's number); dial Ernie's number) or the plan in either order do both f dial Ernie's number; look up Ernie's number g.
By rule 4, P is epistemically feasible if T1(P) is. Applying rule 3 to T1(P), and making use of our solution to the KP problem for actions from the previous section, we derive the following rule:
Rule 5: P is epistemically feasible for A at T if A knows at T that, a. At each stage of the execution of P, A will know whether P has successfully nished; b. At each stage of the execution of P, if P has not successfully nished, then A knows which speci c action constitutes the next step of P; and c. P will eventually nish successfully.
For example, the plan \sequence(look up Ernie's number; dial Ernie's number)" is epistemically feasible for Aunt Edith because:
Initially, Edith knows that the rst step is to look up Ernie's number, which she knows how to do. After the rst step, Edith knows that the next step is to dial Ernie's number, which she now knows how to do; And after the rst two steps, Edith knows that she has successfully nished the plan.
Note that rule 5 works for the two cases mentioned above where rules 1 and 2 fail. The plan \sequence(take half the apples out of the barrel; take out the remaining half)" is epistemically feasible because:
Until the barrel is empty, the agent knows that the next step is to take out an apple; When the barrel is empty, the agent knows that the plan has successfully nished.
The plan \if Q then do f(X) else do f(X)" is epistemically feasible because the agent knows that the rst step is f(X).
But now we can see that rule 5 is all we need; rule 5 entirely subsumes rules 1 through 4. (We will prove this formally for rules 1, 2, and 4 in section 3; the proof of rule 3 is similar.) The semantics of the planning language de nes what is the next step of a sequence, a conditional, or a loop in every circumstance. Once that is de ned for a plan, rule 5 is su cient to determine whether the plan is epistemically feasible.
Our nal step is to turn rule 5 into a de nition by making it a biconditional:
De nition 1: A determinate plan P is epistemically feasible for A at T if and only if A knows at T that, a. At each stage of the execution of P, A will know whether P has successfully nished; b. At each stage of the execution of P, if P has not successfully nished, then A knows which speci c action constitutes the next step of P; and c. P will eventually nish successfully.
There is also a weaker notion of epistemic feasibility that is sometimes relevant. Suppose that it is in fact the case that the directory lists my name and number, but Aunt Edith does not know this. Then an omniscient observer can see that if she attempts to execute the plan \sequence(look up Ernie's number; dial Ernie's number)" she will succeed, but she herself does not know this. We unknown number of apples; PA is \take half the apples out of the barrel" and PB is \take out the remaining half." Then \sequence(PA; PB)" can be carried out simply by emptying the barrel. However PA is not epistemically feasible, since you don't know when to stop. (Some readers may have the intuition that under these circumstance PA should be considered epistemically feasible; just empty the barrel and you know that you did carry out PA plus some extra. But under that criterion, rule 1 would fail as a necessary condition; PA by itself would be epistemically feasible, but \sequence(PA;announce success)" would not.) Other readers may have the intuition that \sequence(PA; PB)" should not be considered epistemically infeasible, since an ordinary plan interpreter will not be able to execute it. However, it is certainly possible to implement an plan interpreter that can execute it, by using multiple program counters when a condition cannot be resolvbed. Moreover, it is unwise to make the convenience of programs the basis for the de nition of fundamental concepts.) (Failure of the converse of rule 2.) There are cases where an agent knows how to perform \ifQ then do P1 else do P2" in S without knowing whether Q holds in S; namely, if P1 is the same as P2, or if P1 and P2 begin the same, and the truth of Q in S will be found out before they start to diverge. For example, consider the parameterized plan p(X; Y ) = \if q holds then do f(X) else do f(Y )". In the case where X = Y , p(X; Y ) can be performed without knowing whether q holds, just by performing f(X).
In both of the above cases, though Moore's axioms do not imply that the plan in the given form is feasible, they do imply that a plan known to be equivalent is feasible. In the rst case, the agent knows that the plan is equivalent to \take all the apples out of the barrel;" in the second case, the agent knows that the plan is equivalent to \do f(X)." This observation suggests that we augment Moore's theory with the following rule:
Rule 4: Plan P is epistemically feasible for agent A at time T if there exists a plan P 0 such that a. P 0 is epistemically feasible for A at T; and b. A knows at time T that P 0 is equivalent to P starting at T.
It is important in rule 4 that the existence of P 0 has larger scope than A's knowledge of its equivalence to P. The statement \A knows that there exists a P 0 . . ." would not be a su cient condition. For example, Aunt Edith knows that there exists an epistemically feasible plan that is equivalent to \Dial Ernie's number;" namely \Dial(N)" for some value of N. The point is that she does not know which such P 0 is equivalent.
We now consider a particular plan transformation: For any plan P, let T1(P) be the plan while (P has not successfully nished) do (the next step 4 of P)
All we have done here is to push the whole structure of P away into the term \the next step of P". However, this maneuver has very important consequences for our de nition, since \the next step of P" is a term that denotes a single action, and, therefore, it comes under the solution of the KP problem for actions. Thus rule 4 allows us to reduce the analysis of any plan to the case of a single while loop containing a single primitive action.
These representations are not without their di culties and limitations, mostly deriving from the rather vague character of the relation \knowing what Q is." However, nothing better has been developed, and in this paper this family of solutions to the KP problem for actions is adopted without further discussion.
Determinate plans
In addressing the KP problem for plans, Moore posits a set of axioms that characterize knowledge preconditions for plans built up recursively from primitive actions using control structures such as \sequence(P1 . . .Pk)," \if(Q; P1; P2)," and \while(Q; P1; P2)." The following axioms, among others, are posited:
Rule 1: The plan \sequence(P1; P2)" is epistemically feasible for agent A at time T if A knows at T that a. P1 is epistemically feasible for A at T; and b. After P1 is executed, P2 will be epistemically feasible.
For example, the plan \sequence(look up Ernie's number; dial Ernie's number)" is epistemically feasible because my aunt now knows how to look up my number, and she knows that, after she looks up my number, she will know how to dial my number.
Rule 2: The plan \if Q then do P1 else do P2" is epistemically feasible for agent A at time T if either a. A knows at T that Q holds at T and P1 is epistemically feasible for A at T; or b. A knows at T that Q does not hold at T and P2 is epistemically feasible for A at T.
For example, the plan \if it is raining out then put on a raincoat else put on a jacket" is feasible if either I know that it is raining out and I know how I can put on a raincoat or if I know that it is not raining out and I know how I can put on a jacket.
Rule 3: 2 The plan \while Q do PA" is epistemically feasible for agent A at time T if A knows at T that a. At each iteration point (that is, at T and at the end of each iteration of PA), A will know whether Q holds; b. At each iteration point, if Q holds, then PA is epistemically feasible; c. Eventually, the loop will terminate; that is, there will come an iteration point when Q does not hold.
However, there are gaps in these rules; these conditions are su cient but not necessary. 3 Examples:
(Failure of the converse of rule 1.) There are cases where \sequence(PA; PB)" is epistemically feasible even though PA is not. For example, suppose that there is a barrel containing an
The question of whether an agent is able to carry out a plan may be divided into two parts. First, is the plan physically feasible for the agent; that is, is it physically possible to carry out the actions speci ed by the plan? Second, is the plan epistemically feasible; that is, does the agent know enough to perform the plan? A plan like \Make money at the roulette wheel by betting on the numbers that win," is not a useful one; though the physical actions involved are feasible, there is no way to nd out in time what they are.
The epistemic feasibility of a plan depends both on the knowledge the agent has at the beginning of execution, and on the knowledge he 1 gains during the course of execution. For example, suppose that my aunt Edith does not know my phone number, but she has a directory in which she knows that my name is listed. In that case, she is not immediately able to carry out the plan \dial Ernie's number," but she is immediately able to carry out the plan \sequence(look up Ernie's number; dial Ernie's number)".
The problem addressed in this paper is to characterize the epistemic feasibility of a plan in terms of the physical content of the plan and of the evolving knowledge of the agent. We propose a characterization of epistemic feasibility that applies to any plan, determinate or indeterminate, carried out by a single agent performing one primitive action at a time. We show, for this class of plans, our de nition strictly subsumes previous de nitions of epistemic feasibility, and that it supports a wide range of natural and powerful conclusions.
Section 1 informally presents the problem and solution. Section 2 discusses the formal structure of the theory. Section 3 presents some general theorems. Section 4 discusses possible extensions to the theory.
Knowledge Preconditions
Reasoning about the epistemic feasibility of plans requires a theory that integrates temporal reasoning with reasoning about knowledge. In order to determine whether an agent knows enough to perform a plan, we must be able to characterize what knows at the beginning of the plan, and how the state of the world and the knowledge of the agent change as a result of the execution of the plan. Like the relation, \At time T agent A knows fact ", the relation, \At time T, agent A knows enough to perform plan P" is referentially opaque (intensional) in its nal argument. Aunt Edith does not at this moment have enough information to perform the action \Dial Ernie's phone number", but she does have enough information to perform the action \Dial 998-3123" which is extensionally the same action.
The problem of characterizing the epistemic feasibility of actions or plans, sometimes called the knowledge preconditions problem, was brie y addressed in McCarthy and Hayes, 69] . The rst in-depth study of the problem was that of Moore 1980 Moore , 1985 , which we will describe below. More recently, the problem was considered by Morgenstern 1988] , who modi ed Moore's theory by using a syntactic theory of knowledge and extended it to apply to plans involving multiple agents and the communications between them. However, for the single agent case, the basic structure of the two theories is quite similar, and, though I will use Moore's theory as a referent below, the same analysis applies with minor changes to Morgenstern's. Moore divides the problem of epistemic feasibility into two parts:
1. The knowledge preconditions (KP) problem for actions. Characterizing whether an agent knows enough to perform a single speci ed action in a given situation. 
Abstract
For an agent to be able to rely on a plan, he must know both that he is physically capable of carrying out the physical actions involved, and that he knows enough to carry out the plan. In this talk, we advance and discuss new de nitions of \knowing enough to carry out a plan", for the case of a single agent carrying out a sequence of primitive actions one at a time. We consider both determinate and indeterminate plans.
De nition: A plan P (determinate or indeterminate) is executable for agent A at time T if and only if, a. P terminates when executed starting in T; and b. After any beginning of the execution of P starting in T, b.i A will know whether P has successfully nished; b.ii A will know of every action whether or not it is a next step of P; and b.iii All the next steps of P are feasible.
De nition: An indeterminate plan P is epistemically feasible as a task for agent A at time T if there exists a plan P 0 such that A knows in T that a. P 0 is executable for A at T; and b. Any execution of P 0 starting in T will constitute an execution of P starting in T.
We show how these de nition can be expressed in a formal logic, using a situation calculus model of time and a possible worlds model of knowledge. The de nitions strictly subsume previous theories for the single-agent case without concurrent actions.
We illustrate the power of the de nition by showing that it supports results of the following kinds:
Positive veri cation: Showing that a plan is feasible. Negative veri cation: Showing that a plan is infeasible. Monotonicity: The more an agent knows, the more plans are executable. Reduction for omniscient agent: For an omniscient agent, a plan is executable if and only if it is necessarily physically feasible, and a plan is epistemically feasible as task if and only if it is possibly physically feasible. Simple recursive rules that are su cient conditions for the feasibility of a plan described as a sequence or a conditional combination of subplans.
Thanks to Jim Crawford, David Etherington, Haym Hirsch, Diane Litman, and Bart Selman for helpful suggestions and criticisms. This research was supported by NSF grant #IRI-9001447
